November 10, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
When he taught research methods as a grad student, Michael Schwartz gave his students this assignment: “Create a survey to show . . .” and he would tell them the conclusion he wanted the survey to support. The next week, he’d give them the same assignment but with the desired conclusion the opposite of the first one.
A year and a half ago, I criticized (here) a much publicized study by Dan Klein and Zeljka Buturovic: “This survey, I said, “wasn’t designed to discover what people think. It was designed to prove a political point,” and that point was that liberal ideology blinds people to economic facts.
I was reminded of Mike’s assignment when I read Klein’s recent article at The Atlantic. In a bit of academic fairness that’s probably all too rare, Klein went on to create a survey designed to see if conservative ideology has a similar effect.
Klein hoped that his conservative and libertarian allies would not so readily agree with politically friendly economic ideas that were nevertheless unsound. But conservatives in the new survey were “equally stupid” as the liberals in the earlier survey.
Klein also expected some nasty nyah-nyahing from his liberal critics. But no, “The reaction to the new paper was quieter than I expected.” In fact, one of those liberal critics, Matt Yglesias, offered an observation that Klein used as his takeaway from the two surveys: “there’s a lot of confirmation bias out there.”
Yes, but confirmation bias is not just something that affects people who respond to surveys. As Mike’s assignment makes clear, we also need to be wary of confirmation bias on the part of those who create the surveys. There is the further problem I mentioned in my earlier post: a one-shot survey is inherently ambiguous. We can’t be sure just what the respondents really hear when they are asked the question.
My own takeaway, besides admiration for Klein’s honesty, is that when you design your research as a statement (proving some point), you don’t learn nearly as much as when you design it as a genuine question.
Defining Deviance — Up and Down
November 9, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Most of the increase in economic inequality over the past two or three decades comes from the enormous growth in money going to the very rich. David Brooks attributes that growth in part to a change in culture.*
But they don’t change all by themselves – as though they were part of some “low-pressure system” or “cold air mass” moving into the region. And the change is not always towards looser standards. Moral entrepreneurs campaign to define deviancy up, and sometimes they succeed. If we were back in the pre-feminist, “Mad Men” world of the 1950s, Herman Cain wouldn’t be having his current problems.** But women – those pesky feminists – in just a few decades, have changed the dominant public judgment about men using a position of power to get laid. Once accepted, maybe even admired and envied, it’s now something a guy doesn’t want other people, even his friends, to know about.
“Mad Men” shows us some other examples of deviance defined up. Look in on an ad agency today and you won’t see anyone smoking. A few souls may go out to the street for a cigarette break, but we see their smoking not as pleasure but as addiction, something to be pitied. Nor will you see anyone coming back drunk from a three-martini lunch or pouring himself a tumbler of Canadian Club in his office. Score one for the anti-tobacco and anti-drunkenness forces.
Besides moral entrepreneurship, norms can change as a matter of invidious social comparison – when those lower down the social scale take cues from those above them. Fashions in clothes or names filter down through the class structure. So do ideas of unacceptable behavior. In the 18th century, new canons of manners started with the court, then the aspiring gentry, and eventually even commoners were embarrassed by the audible belch or fart. In the 21st century, it’s not that we suddenly realized that drinking at work or smoking is harmful. Rather, as my British friend once said, “it isn’t done” – meaning that it isn’t done by people of our social position. In fact, moral entrepreneurs might be more successful if instead of trying to convince people that something is wrong, they tried to convince them it is low class.
As Oscar Wilde said,
* Brooks is a conservative columnist for the New York Times. But his liberal counterpart on the Times op-ed page, Paul Krugman, years ago offered a similar explanation for the skyrocketing pay of those at the top.
** For those who might not remember: in 2011, when I originally posted this, Herman Cain, a business executive, was a candidate for the Republican nomination for President, and some of his female former employees had accused him of sexual harassment.
Posted by Jay Livingston
Most of the increase in economic inequality over the past two or three decades comes from the enormous growth in money going to the very rich. David Brooks attributes that growth in part to a change in culture.*
You see a shift in social norms. Up until 1970 or so, a chief executive would have been embarrassed to take home more than $20 million. But now there is no shame, and top compensation zooms upward.It’s what Daniel Patrick Moynihan nearly two decades ago (1993) called “defining deviancy down.” Things which had once been a matter of shame have become acceptable. Norms change.
But they don’t change all by themselves – as though they were part of some “low-pressure system” or “cold air mass” moving into the region. And the change is not always towards looser standards. Moral entrepreneurs campaign to define deviancy up, and sometimes they succeed. If we were back in the pre-feminist, “Mad Men” world of the 1950s, Herman Cain wouldn’t be having his current problems.** But women – those pesky feminists – in just a few decades, have changed the dominant public judgment about men using a position of power to get laid. Once accepted, maybe even admired and envied, it’s now something a guy doesn’t want other people, even his friends, to know about.
“Mad Men” shows us some other examples of deviance defined up. Look in on an ad agency today and you won’t see anyone smoking. A few souls may go out to the street for a cigarette break, but we see their smoking not as pleasure but as addiction, something to be pitied. Nor will you see anyone coming back drunk from a three-martini lunch or pouring himself a tumbler of Canadian Club in his office. Score one for the anti-tobacco and anti-drunkenness forces.
Besides moral entrepreneurship, norms can change as a matter of invidious social comparison – when those lower down the social scale take cues from those above them. Fashions in clothes or names filter down through the class structure. So do ideas of unacceptable behavior. In the 18th century, new canons of manners started with the court, then the aspiring gentry, and eventually even commoners were embarrassed by the audible belch or fart. In the 21st century, it’s not that we suddenly realized that drinking at work or smoking is harmful. Rather, as my British friend once said, “it isn’t done” – meaning that it isn’t done by people of our social position. In fact, moral entrepreneurs might be more successful if instead of trying to convince people that something is wrong, they tried to convince them it is low class.
As Oscar Wilde said,
As long as war is regarded as wicked, it will always have its fascination. When it is looked upon as vulgar, it will cease to be popular. (HT: Mark Kleiman)-----------
* Brooks is a conservative columnist for the New York Times. But his liberal counterpart on the Times op-ed page, Paul Krugman, years ago offered a similar explanation for the skyrocketing pay of those at the top.
** For those who might not remember: in 2011, when I originally posted this, Herman Cain, a business executive, was a candidate for the Republican nomination for President, and some of his female former employees had accused him of sexual harassment.
Patriotism Goes to the Movies
November 7, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
“Patriotism,” says Paul Krugman. “is about making sacrifices for the national good, not serving your personal motives or interests.” Krugman (in his blog, here ) was citing Michael Lind’s Slate article about “The Patriot,” the 2000 film starring Mel Gibson. Lind complains that the Patriot of the title, “sits out the American Revolution, until a sadistic . . . British commander kills one of his sons. whereupon he spends the next two days – oops, I mean two hours – avenging himself.”
That’s not patriotism, harrumphs Lind, it’s “amoral familism”*
Patriotism may be the last refuge of a scoundrel, but it’s no refuge at all for a filmmaker. Real-life Americans are patriotic, sometimes to an extent others find offensive. But that kind of patriotism doesn’t make for good movies. In the American movies that I know, good guys never do their good deeds out of abstract idealism. Their motives are always personal. (Even better than a non-ideoogical hero is the character who has an ideology but abandons it in order to kill bad guys – e.g., Grace Kelly in “High Noon”).
America movie-heroes often take up arms against bad guys, but we would mistrust a hero whose actions are purely ideological and not rooted in personal revenge. Our heroes, even when they are fighting for Good, have the decency to deny any ideological motive. Here’s one familiar (I hope) example:
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* The term comes from Edward Banfield’s 1958 book The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Amoral familism, according to Banfield, was that basis.
Posted by Jay Livingston
“Patriotism,” says Paul Krugman. “is about making sacrifices for the national good, not serving your personal motives or interests.” Krugman (in his blog, here ) was citing Michael Lind’s Slate article about “The Patriot,” the 2000 film starring Mel Gibson. Lind complains that the Patriot of the title, “sits out the American Revolution, until a sadistic . . . British commander kills one of his sons. whereupon he spends the next two days – oops, I mean two hours – avenging himself.”
That’s not patriotism, harrumphs Lind, it’s “amoral familism”*
It appears that today's audiences can't imagine any cause that could justify political violence other than injury to a child or wife.Maybe so. But the writer and director do understand something that Lind apparently does not: movies are not real life. If they are, then “Singin’ in the Rain” is deeply subversive of rational reactions to meteorological events.
This movie is deeply subversive of patriotism. Indeed, patriotism is a concept that neither the screenwriter . . nor the director . . . seems to understand.
Patriotism may be the last refuge of a scoundrel, but it’s no refuge at all for a filmmaker. Real-life Americans are patriotic, sometimes to an extent others find offensive. But that kind of patriotism doesn’t make for good movies. In the American movies that I know, good guys never do their good deeds out of abstract idealism. Their motives are always personal. (Even better than a non-ideoogical hero is the character who has an ideology but abandons it in order to kill bad guys – e.g., Grace Kelly in “High Noon”).
America movie-heroes often take up arms against bad guys, but we would mistrust a hero whose actions are purely ideological and not rooted in personal revenge. Our heroes, even when they are fighting for Good, have the decency to deny any ideological motive. Here’s one familiar (I hope) example:
I’m afraid Michael Lind would be disappointed in Rick, and in Grace Kelly shooting the bad guy to protect her husband. “[In] the Zeitgeist in the United States in A.D. 2000 . . . American national patriotism is giving way . . .to the perennial rival of patriotism at all levels: amoral familism.”
If that’s the Zeitgeist, it’s a Geist that goes back a long Zeit. “Casablanca” was made in 1942, “High Noon” in 1952. Or take another classic from the early 1950s, “On the Waterfront.” Marlon Brando winds up doing the right thing in ratting out the racketeer union boss (the right thing according to the film’s construction of morality). But it’s not until he has a personal reason – the union boss has his brother Charley killed – that he takes action.
If that’s the Zeitgeist, it’s a Geist that goes back a long Zeit. “Casablanca” was made in 1942, “High Noon” in 1952. Or take another classic from the early 1950s, “On the Waterfront.” Marlon Brando winds up doing the right thing in ratting out the racketeer union boss (the right thing according to the film’s construction of morality). But it’s not until he has a personal reason – the union boss has his brother Charley killed – that he takes action.
You gave it to Joey, you gave it to Dugan, and you gave it to Charley who was one of your own.. . and I’m glad what I done to you!The film’s attempts to make stevedores spout lofty motives ring embarrassingly false, as when one of the longshoremen urges Brando to defy the boss in order to
give us back our union, so we can run it on the up and up.
(I still cringe when I hear that line.)
Is this bias towards the personal and against the political an aspect of American culture? Or is it the medium? Maybe political ideals – socialist realism, capitalist realism, patriot realism, etc. – don’t make for compelling movies. Movies are first about characters, not ideas. The medium washes out the message.
Is this bias towards the personal and against the political an aspect of American culture? Or is it the medium? Maybe political ideals – socialist realism, capitalist realism, patriot realism, etc. – don’t make for compelling movies. Movies are first about characters, not ideas. The medium washes out the message.
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* The term comes from Edward Banfield’s 1958 book The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Amoral familism, according to Banfield, was that basis.
Lying With Statistics, and Really Lying With Statistics
November 4, 2011
“The #1 way to lie with statistics is . . . to just lie!” says Andrew Gelman, who a) knows much about statistics and b) is very good at spotting statistical dishonesty.
But maybe there’s a difference between lying with statistics and just plain making stuff up.
I’ve commented before about social psychologists’ affinity for Candid-Camera deception, but this Dutch practitioner goes way beyond that. [The Telegraph has the story .]
Posted by Jay Livingston
“The #1 way to lie with statistics is . . . to just lie!” says Andrew Gelman, who a) knows much about statistics and b) is very good at spotting statistical dishonesty.
But maybe there’s a difference between lying with statistics and just plain making stuff up.
I’ve commented before about social psychologists’ affinity for Candid-Camera deception, but this Dutch practitioner goes way beyond that. [The Telegraph has the story .]
The committee set up to investigate Prof Stapel said after its preliminary investigation it had found "several dozen publications in which use was made of fictitious data" . . .
[Stapel’s] paper that linked thoughts of eating meat eating with anti-social behaviour was met with scorn and disbelief when it was publicised in August, it took several doctoral candidates Stapel was mentoring to unmask him. . . .What’s truly unsettling is to think that maybe he’s not the only one.
the three graduate students grew suspicious of the data Prof Stapel had supplied them without allowing them to participate in the actual research. When they ran statistical tests on it themselves they found it too perfect to be true and went to the university's dean with their suspicions.
Abstract Preferences and Real Choices
November 3, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Cross-posted at Sociological Images
We’ve known for a long time that surveys are often very bad at predicting behavior. To take the example that Malcom Gladwell uses, if you ask Americans what kind of coffee they want, most will say “a dark, rich, hearty roast.” But what they actually prefer to drink is “milky, weak coffee.”
Something that sounds good in the abstract turns out to be different from the stuff you actually have to drink.
Election polls usually have better luck since indicating your choice to a voting machine isn’t all that different from speaking that choice to a pollster. But political preference polls as well can run into that abstract-vs.-actual problem.
Real Clear Politics recently printed some poll results that were anything but real clear. RCP looked at polls matching Obama against the various Republican candidates. In every case, if you use the average results of the different polls, Obama comes out on top. But in polls that matched Obama against “a Republican,” the Republican wins.
Apparently, the best strategy for the GOP is nominate a candidate but not tell anyone who it is.
Posted by Jay Livingston
Cross-posted at Sociological Images
We’ve known for a long time that surveys are often very bad at predicting behavior. To take the example that Malcom Gladwell uses, if you ask Americans what kind of coffee they want, most will say “a dark, rich, hearty roast.” But what they actually prefer to drink is “milky, weak coffee.”
Something that sounds good in the abstract turns out to be different from the stuff you actually have to drink.
Election polls usually have better luck since indicating your choice to a voting machine isn’t all that different from speaking that choice to a pollster. But political preference polls as well can run into that abstract-vs.-actual problem.
Real Clear Politics recently printed some poll results that were anything but real clear. RCP looked at polls matching Obama against the various Republican candidates. In every case, if you use the average results of the different polls, Obama comes out on top. But in polls that matched Obama against “a Republican,” the Republican wins.
The graph shows only the average of the polls. RCP also provides the results
of the various polls (CNN, Rasmussen, ABCl, etc.)
of the various polls (CNN, Rasmussen, ABCl, etc.)
Apparently, the best strategy for the GOP is nominate a candidate but not tell anyone who it is.
The Distribution of the Wealthy
November 2, 2011
After reading David Brooks’s column in the Times yesterday, I was catching up on podcasts of KCRW’s “The Business.” The installment from three weeks ago included a short clip from the “30 Rock” pilot:
The two costumes in each color reveal a basic inequality. In the Blue
The Blue inequality is confined to “New York City, Los Angeles, Boston, San Francisco, Seattle, Dallas, Houston and the District of Columbia.” The Red inequality is “everywhere else.”
These costumes are colorful; they capture our attention. But they can mask other realities.* As Brad de Long points out, the economic and social gulf between the educated and the uneducated – Brooks’s Red inequality – is just as wide, perhaps wider, in New York as in Fresno. Brad also unfairly goes to Forbes magazine and waves the page showing the geography of the very wealthiest. It looks like there’s a bit of Bluish inequality in the heartland too.
“I count 6 of the top 10 living in regions where Brooks claims people like them don't live,” Brad says. But three of those six are Waltons (John-boy didn’t make the list this year), and ten is hardly all of the top 1%.
Howard Wial at the Atlantic uses IRS data to give a more complete picture. He uses $200,000 household income as his cutoff point – the top 3% rather than the 1%. But while the lives at the 99th percentile may be different from those only at th 97th, the maps are probably similar.
Here’s where the wealthy are.
The twenty MSAs shown in shades of green (nice choice) account for slightly more than half of all such households. Which means that nearly half of the top 3% live everywhere else. The New York area is home to 11.5% of the wealthy. But then, it’s home to more people of every income. So Wial looks at the ratio of wealthy to nonwealthy. A handful of rich folks can make a difference in a small population like Washoe County, NV and Natrona County, WY, which go from gray to green (who’s rich in Casper?). But in Phoenix, the population is so large that the although many wealthy people live there (2% of all wealthy people in the US), they are under-represented.
It’s not surprising that the Occupy movement started in New York, nor that it has spread to other places highlighted in these maps. But as Wial says, Occupy protests have also sprung up in “such seemingly unlikely locales as Anderson, Indiana, and Texarkana, Texas.”
If you’re looking for only red and blue, you’ll miss a lot of interesting purple shades, from magenta and mauve to puce and plum.
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* Brooks has done this before, notably in Bobos in Paradise. See Sasha Issenberg’s article http://www.phillymag.com/articles/booboos_in_paradise/ in PhillyMag for notes on Brooks’s blindness to inconvenient realities and his just plain making stuff up.
Posted by Jay Livingston
After reading David Brooks’s column in the Times yesterday, I was catching up on podcasts of KCRW’s “The Business.” The installment from three weeks ago included a short clip from the “30 Rock” pilot:
DONAGHY: Sure. I gotcha. New York, third wave feminist. College educated. Single and pretending to be happy about it. Over scheduled, under sexed. You buy any magazine that says ‘healthy body image’ on the cover. And... Every two years you take up knitting for... a week.Like Jack Donaghy, David Brooks gets a lot of mileage out of cultural stereotypes. That’s because there’s some truth to them. Yesterday, the day after Halloween, he went back to the closet and pulled out his favorite costumes – two Blue, two Red.
The two costumes in each color reveal a basic inequality. In the Blue
- the urban elites, concocting complex financial deals and buying expensive merch
- the unwealthy liberal liberal-arts majors in Zucotti Park.
- the solid middle-class, unpretentious and hard-working
- dropouts struggling to find work and keep their families together – struggling but too often failing.
The Blue inequality is confined to “New York City, Los Angeles, Boston, San Francisco, Seattle, Dallas, Houston and the District of Columbia.” The Red inequality is “everywhere else.”
These costumes are colorful; they capture our attention. But they can mask other realities.* As Brad de Long points out, the economic and social gulf between the educated and the uneducated – Brooks’s Red inequality – is just as wide, perhaps wider, in New York as in Fresno. Brad also unfairly goes to Forbes magazine and waves the page showing the geography of the very wealthiest. It looks like there’s a bit of Bluish inequality in the heartland too.
“I count 6 of the top 10 living in regions where Brooks claims people like them don't live,” Brad says. But three of those six are Waltons (John-boy didn’t make the list this year), and ten is hardly all of the top 1%.
Howard Wial at the Atlantic uses IRS data to give a more complete picture. He uses $200,000 household income as his cutoff point – the top 3% rather than the 1%. But while the lives at the 99th percentile may be different from those only at th 97th, the maps are probably similar.
Here’s where the wealthy are.
The twenty MSAs shown in shades of green (nice choice) account for slightly more than half of all such households. Which means that nearly half of the top 3% live everywhere else. The New York area is home to 11.5% of the wealthy. But then, it’s home to more people of every income. So Wial looks at the ratio of wealthy to nonwealthy. A handful of rich folks can make a difference in a small population like Washoe County, NV and Natrona County, WY, which go from gray to green (who’s rich in Casper?). But in Phoenix, the population is so large that the although many wealthy people live there (2% of all wealthy people in the US), they are under-represented.
It’s not surprising that the Occupy movement started in New York, nor that it has spread to other places highlighted in these maps. But as Wial says, Occupy protests have also sprung up in “such seemingly unlikely locales as Anderson, Indiana, and Texarkana, Texas.”
If you’re looking for only red and blue, you’ll miss a lot of interesting purple shades, from magenta and mauve to puce and plum.
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* Brooks has done this before, notably in Bobos in Paradise. See Sasha Issenberg’s article http://www.phillymag.com/articles/booboos_in_paradise/ in PhillyMag for notes on Brooks’s blindness to inconvenient realities and his just plain making stuff up.
Start-ups and Safety Nets
October 30, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Cross-posted at Sociological Images.
Is socialized medicine the road to serfdom, a snare that will sap people of their independence? Or is it liberating?
James Wimberly had a great post yesterday at The Reality Based Community (here), and I’m neither too proud nor too ethical to steal his data and summarize his idea.
George W. Bush did not really say, “The problem with the French is that they have no word for entrepreneur.” But that statement does fit with the American tendency to view our country as the land of entrepreneurship (literally “enterprise”). America is, after all, the land of opportunity, where anyone can become rich. And the way to get rich is to be an independent, risk-taking entrepreneur and start your own business. That’s what we do here in the US, and we do it better than most. At least that’s what we think.
But look at this chart showing the rate of start-ups per working-age population.
The US ranks 23rd. That doesn’t quite square with all those photo-ops where the president (Obama, Bush, Clinton – they all do it) goes to some small successful company out in the heartland. What is it about these other countries that makes for more risk-taking?
Wimberly has an answer: the safety net. He makes the point with an analogy – his own photos of kids on a rope-walk – a single rope hung between two platforms in what looks like the Brazilian rain forest. (It’s really just a replanted hillside, formerly the site of a favela). The kids have safety devices – hard hats, a safety harness, guide-ropes to hold on to. Without these, only a few of the most f oolhardy would try a Philippe Petit walk. But the safety devices allow lots of kids to take a risk they would otherwise avoid.
The same logic applies to small business.
See Wimberly’s entire post – with the photos, footnotes, and comments – for a fuller explanation.
Posted by Jay Livingston
Cross-posted at Sociological Images.
Is socialized medicine the road to serfdom, a snare that will sap people of their independence? Or is it liberating?
James Wimberly had a great post yesterday at The Reality Based Community (here), and I’m neither too proud nor too ethical to steal his data and summarize his idea.
George W. Bush did not really say, “The problem with the French is that they have no word for entrepreneur.” But that statement does fit with the American tendency to view our country as the land of entrepreneurship (literally “enterprise”). America is, after all, the land of opportunity, where anyone can become rich. And the way to get rich is to be an independent, risk-taking entrepreneur and start your own business. That’s what we do here in the US, and we do it better than most. At least that’s what we think.
But look at this chart showing the rate of start-ups per working-age population.
Wimberly has an answer: the safety net. He makes the point with an analogy – his own photos of kids on a rope-walk – a single rope hung between two platforms in what looks like the Brazilian rain forest. (It’s really just a replanted hillside, formerly the site of a favela). The kids have safety devices – hard hats, a safety harness, guide-ropes to hold on to. Without these, only a few of the most f oolhardy would try a Philippe Petit walk. But the safety devices allow lots of kids to take a risk they would otherwise avoid.
The same logic applies to small business.
How many Americans are locked into jobs they hate by the fear of losing health benefits? No Dane ever has to worry about losing her right to medical care by quitting her job to go it aloneSafety devices cost money, but they pay off. On the rope-walk, you can see the reward in the expression on the kids’ faces when they reach the other platform. In the national data, you see it in the those start-ups.
The countries with significantly higher startup rates than the USA are those with stronger, more comprehensive, and more centralised social safety nets, along with correspondingly higher taxation.
The Use of Bad Words (Two F**king Links)
October 29, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
I’m not a huge fan of curse words, though I know some people swear by them. Repeat them, and they quickly lose whatever effect they might have had,* and then what do you use for emphasis or surprise.
There are exceptions, like Ian Frazier’s “Cursing Mommy” (here for example). And then there’s Colin Nissan’s recent essay in McSweeny’s on decorative gourds for autumn. I laughed out loud when I read it. Then I went back and mentally removed the curse words, and it was just not funny. Try it.
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* Sometimes draining the word of its impact is the goal of such repetition, as when David Bradley (you mean you haven’t read The Chaneysville Incident?) teaches Huckleberry Finn to high school students.
Posted by Jay Livingston
I’m not a huge fan of curse words, though I know some people swear by them. Repeat them, and they quickly lose whatever effect they might have had,* and then what do you use for emphasis or surprise.
There are exceptions, like Ian Frazier’s “Cursing Mommy” (here for example). And then there’s Colin Nissan’s recent essay in McSweeny’s on decorative gourds for autumn. I laughed out loud when I read it. Then I went back and mentally removed the curse words, and it was just not funny. Try it.
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* Sometimes draining the word of its impact is the goal of such repetition, as when David Bradley (you mean you haven’t read The Chaneysville Incident?) teaches Huckleberry Finn to high school students.
“One of the first things I do is I make everybody say it out loud about six or seven times,” Bradley said.
“The N-word?” Pitts [the “60 Minutes” inteviewer] asked.
“Yeah, ‘nigger.’ Get over it,” Bradley replied, laughing. “You know. Now let's talk about the book.”
Words and Pictures
October 27, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Cross-posted at Sociological Images
Newspapers report facts – thing that actually happened. They run photos of things that actually happened. They don’t make stuff up. But they do choose which facts to report, and they do choose which photos to run. Usually the two are congruent.
But not always. Wonkette ran this photo of a page from the Washington Post.
Wonkette and other sites have contrasted the photo with this video of a cop deliberately firing a tear gas canister at close range directly at a group of demonstrators who had come to aid of someone who had been hit in the head with a tear gas canister.
But what’s also noteworthy is the contrast between the photo (nice cop, nice kitty, nothing violent happening here) and the Post’s own lede: “Police fired tear gas and beanbags. . . .”
Posted by Jay Livingston
Cross-posted at Sociological Images
Newspapers report facts – thing that actually happened. They run photos of things that actually happened. They don’t make stuff up. But they do choose which facts to report, and they do choose which photos to run. Usually the two are congruent.
But not always. Wonkette ran this photo of a page from the Washington Post.
But what’s also noteworthy is the contrast between the photo (nice cop, nice kitty, nothing violent happening here) and the Post’s own lede: “Police fired tear gas and beanbags. . . .”
You’re the Boss?
October 26, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Why do people work? More specifically, why do some people work more and others less?
N. Gregory Mankiw has an idea, which he shared with us in Sunday’s New York Times.
The French spend about 15% less time, on average, in paid work each day (251 minutes to our 289). (OECD summary and spreadsheet here). Over a lifetime, as Mankiw says, those 38 minutes a day add up to many fewer hours over the course of a lifetime. (I’m not sure why lifetime hours is the appropriate measure when GDP is computed as an annual figure. Whatever.)
Mankiw is an economist, a very successful economist – best-selling textbook, head of Bush II’s Council of Economic Advisers, currently Mitt Romney’s chief economic adviser. So he takes the economist’s view of motivation: how much people work depends on how much money they can make. (Mankiw throws in that bit about culture, but I doubt he puts much stock in it and that what he thinks work is really all about is making money and keeping it, i.e., income and taxes.)
Mankiw seems to assume that the decision of how much to work rests entirely with the worker. That’s certainly true for Mankiw himself (see my earlier post on Mankiw’s work decisions here ). But many of us workers don’t have that kind of autonomy. So to get another view of sources of input into this decision of how much to work, I turned to the economic observations of Eddie Cochran:
That French employee doesn’t just decide all by himself, “I think I’ll spend an extra hour at lunch today and give up an hour’s wage.” How much we work is economic and maybe a little cultural. It’s also a matter of politics. There are contracts and laws that are the outcome of organized efforts – by unions and political parties – to limit how much employers can demand of employees. Those laws that affect how much people work may be shaped by culture – shared ideas about work and life. It’s less clear that they are shaped by taxes.
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* In the last two years, many people in the US are working shorter hours than they were before 2008. Some have reduced their work hours to zero. I doubt that this reduction reflects an increased joie de vivre.
It seems incredible to me that a guy as smart as Mankiw can ignore those external constraints on people, assuming instead that workers make these decisions as free and independent individuals, unfettered by institutions, calculating their individual benefits and costs. But now I’m reminded of Fabio Rojas’s post of nearly five years ago, “What Economists Should Learn From Sociology.” Number two on Fabio’s list was “Social networks/social structure matters. Simple idea but few economists sit around and model the effects of social structure.”
Posted by Jay Livingston
Why do people work? More specifically, why do some people work more and others less?
N. Gregory Mankiw has an idea, which he shared with us in Sunday’s New York Times.
Here are two facts about the French economy. First, gross domestic product per capita in France is 29 percent less than it is in the United States, in large part because the French work many fewer hours over their lifetimes than Americans do. Second, the French are taxed more than Americans. In 2009, taxes were 24 percent of G.D.P. in the United States but 42 percent in France.
Economists debate whether higher taxation in France and other European nations is the cause of the reduced work effort and incomes there. Perhaps it is something else entirely — a certain joie de vivre that escapes the nose-to-the-grindstone American culture.
The French spend about 15% less time, on average, in paid work each day (251 minutes to our 289). (OECD summary and spreadsheet here). Over a lifetime, as Mankiw says, those 38 minutes a day add up to many fewer hours over the course of a lifetime. (I’m not sure why lifetime hours is the appropriate measure when GDP is computed as an annual figure. Whatever.)
Mankiw is an economist, a very successful economist – best-selling textbook, head of Bush II’s Council of Economic Advisers, currently Mitt Romney’s chief economic adviser. So he takes the economist’s view of motivation: how much people work depends on how much money they can make. (Mankiw throws in that bit about culture, but I doubt he puts much stock in it and that what he thinks work is really all about is making money and keeping it, i.e., income and taxes.)
Mankiw seems to assume that the decision of how much to work rests entirely with the worker. That’s certainly true for Mankiw himself (see my earlier post on Mankiw’s work decisions here ). But many of us workers don’t have that kind of autonomy. So to get another view of sources of input into this decision of how much to work, I turned to the economic observations of Eddie Cochran:
Every time I call my baby, and try to get a dateYes Gregory, there are bosses. Even in our American “nose-to-the-grindstone” culture, people say, “I have to work late tonight.” Have you ever heard anyone say, “I’m going to work late tonight because I want to make more money – especially now that my income tax has been reduced by two percentage points”? No doubt, there are people like that. But most of the hours in the French and US data are accounted for by people whose hours are determined by external forces.*
My boss says, “No dice son, you gotta work late.”
That French employee doesn’t just decide all by himself, “I think I’ll spend an extra hour at lunch today and give up an hour’s wage.” How much we work is economic and maybe a little cultural. It’s also a matter of politics. There are contracts and laws that are the outcome of organized efforts – by unions and political parties – to limit how much employers can demand of employees. Those laws that affect how much people work may be shaped by culture – shared ideas about work and life. It’s less clear that they are shaped by taxes.
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* In the last two years, many people in the US are working shorter hours than they were before 2008. Some have reduced their work hours to zero. I doubt that this reduction reflects an increased joie de vivre.
It seems incredible to me that a guy as smart as Mankiw can ignore those external constraints on people, assuming instead that workers make these decisions as free and independent individuals, unfettered by institutions, calculating their individual benefits and costs. But now I’m reminded of Fabio Rojas’s post of nearly five years ago, “What Economists Should Learn From Sociology.” Number two on Fabio’s list was “Social networks/social structure matters. Simple idea but few economists sit around and model the effects of social structure.”
The Big Shill
October 25, 2011
Jay Smooth, posted a rap (here) with an outstanding analogy. The media, he says, in its reaction to Occupy Wall Street, is like the shill in the three-card monte game. (Mr. Smooth did not name names, but you get the sense he watches a lot of Fox.)
I liked listening to the dealers’ rhythmic, rhyming rap, and I admired the sleight-of-hand. (The basic move is very simple, but sometimes you’d see a truly skillful dealer who could work the bent-corner variation.)
Mostly, I took a Goffman-esque delight in watching the game, seeing how each person played his role, creating the illusion that the game was honest and winnable, trying to manipulate potential marks using no weapon except self-presentation. Even when a knowing mark did pick the right card, the team had a ruse to avoid the loss while still keeping the appearance of an honest game. The shill would jump in with a $40 bet on a different card, and the dealer would turn that card up, collect the shill’s money and push the mark’s $20 back. “Sorry, only one bet per shuffle.”
It always seemed obvious to me who the shills were. They looked like the dealer (both were usually black in the sea of mostly white tourists) and dressed like the dealer, and they seemed utterly unfazed when they lost a twenty or two on what to the onlookers was obviously the wrong card. Even the occasional white shill (a “salt and pepper” team), with scruffy appearance and clothing, looked less like the passers-by and more like the dealer.
One afternoon as I was walking in Times Square, I saw a young man standing at a 3-card-monte table.** He looked like a preppy college kid from central casting – blonde hair, white polo shirt, green cotton cable-knit sweater knotted loosely over his shoulders. He had reached in his pocket and was fingering a $20, about to make a bet. I don’t know why I suddenly felt protective – maybe I didn’t want our tourists to dislike the city – but I moved up just behind him and said quietly, “If it was as easy as it looks, do you think he’d be here?”
The kid said nothing. He watched as the dealer tossed the cards (“the red, you’re ahead, the black’ll set you back”) and when the dealer stopped (“who saw it – just like that”), the kid put his $20 down. Hadn’t he heard me?
The dealer turned over the queen of hearts and put his $20 on top of it. (“I don’t get mad when I lose, I just grin when I win”), and the kid stayed to play again. And again.
Now that, I thought, is a shill.
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* Jay Smooth calls this role the “ringer.” I was brought up to call it the shill. Academic journal write-ups of psych experiments back in the day, the pre-IRB day, referred to them as “confederates of the experimenter.” Makes it sound more legitimate, don’t you think? But the deceptions of those psych profs would have left the 3-card monte guys drooling with envy and eager to learn.
** The “table” was a flattened cardboard box resting on another cardboard box – easily kicked down and left behind if the cops came by.
(The photo is borrowed from Ephemeral New York)
Posted by Jay Livingston
Jay Smooth, posted a rap (here) with an outstanding analogy. The media, he says, in its reaction to Occupy Wall Street, is like the shill in the three-card monte game. (Mr. Smooth did not name names, but you get the sense he watches a lot of Fox.)
The ringer’s* job is to pretend they’re an objective outside observer commenting on the game when they’re actually part of the hustle who’s there to help bamboozle the public into thinking this game is legitimate.Like this other Jay, I too used to watch the 3-card-monte teams in Times Square back in the 80s.
I liked listening to the dealers’ rhythmic, rhyming rap, and I admired the sleight-of-hand. (The basic move is very simple, but sometimes you’d see a truly skillful dealer who could work the bent-corner variation.) Mostly, I took a Goffman-esque delight in watching the game, seeing how each person played his role, creating the illusion that the game was honest and winnable, trying to manipulate potential marks using no weapon except self-presentation. Even when a knowing mark did pick the right card, the team had a ruse to avoid the loss while still keeping the appearance of an honest game. The shill would jump in with a $40 bet on a different card, and the dealer would turn that card up, collect the shill’s money and push the mark’s $20 back. “Sorry, only one bet per shuffle.”
It always seemed obvious to me who the shills were. They looked like the dealer (both were usually black in the sea of mostly white tourists) and dressed like the dealer, and they seemed utterly unfazed when they lost a twenty or two on what to the onlookers was obviously the wrong card. Even the occasional white shill (a “salt and pepper” team), with scruffy appearance and clothing, looked less like the passers-by and more like the dealer.
One afternoon as I was walking in Times Square, I saw a young man standing at a 3-card-monte table.** He looked like a preppy college kid from central casting – blonde hair, white polo shirt, green cotton cable-knit sweater knotted loosely over his shoulders. He had reached in his pocket and was fingering a $20, about to make a bet. I don’t know why I suddenly felt protective – maybe I didn’t want our tourists to dislike the city – but I moved up just behind him and said quietly, “If it was as easy as it looks, do you think he’d be here?”
The kid said nothing. He watched as the dealer tossed the cards (“the red, you’re ahead, the black’ll set you back”) and when the dealer stopped (“who saw it – just like that”), the kid put his $20 down. Hadn’t he heard me?
The dealer turned over the queen of hearts and put his $20 on top of it. (“I don’t get mad when I lose, I just grin when I win”), and the kid stayed to play again. And again.
Now that, I thought, is a shill.
-------------------------
* Jay Smooth calls this role the “ringer.” I was brought up to call it the shill. Academic journal write-ups of psych experiments back in the day, the pre-IRB day, referred to them as “confederates of the experimenter.” Makes it sound more legitimate, don’t you think? But the deceptions of those psych profs would have left the 3-card monte guys drooling with envy and eager to learn.
** The “table” was a flattened cardboard box resting on another cardboard box – easily kicked down and left behind if the cops came by.
(The photo is borrowed from Ephemeral New York)
Dictatorships Are People, My Friend*
October 23, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
We usually think of a dictatorship as a ship run by dictator – a strongman, a tyrant who has absolute power and can do anything he likes to anyone he doesn’t like. True, but it’s important to remember that dictatorship is not just a matter of personality. It is also a structure. Even a Saddam or a Khaddafi doesn’t do it all by himself. To carry out his directives, he needs other people in other organizations – a coalition of the willing. These usually include the military, but there may also be economic organizations, bureaucracies, and other groups whose strength the “strong man” needs. He has to make sure that they remain willing.
Any dictator worth his salt tries to minimize the power of these groups and to arrogate as much power as he can to himself and his family. Often, that is not possible, and the dictator must allow these others wealth and power in return for their loyalty. But even when it’s all in the family, he has to keep the family happy. Unhappy families are all alike – they can dissolve into conflict and even treachery.
This is one of the messages of The Dictator’s Handbook by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith.
Now, for those who are preoccupied with Wall Street, with its huge salaries and bonuses despite financial failure, Joshua Tucker at The Monkey Cage , extracts the money quote from The Handbook.
* Most readers will recognize the allusion in the title of this post. For those who don’t follow the GOP all that closely, the reference is here.
Posted by Jay Livingston
We usually think of a dictatorship as a ship run by dictator – a strongman, a tyrant who has absolute power and can do anything he likes to anyone he doesn’t like. True, but it’s important to remember that dictatorship is not just a matter of personality. It is also a structure. Even a Saddam or a Khaddafi doesn’t do it all by himself. To carry out his directives, he needs other people in other organizations – a coalition of the willing. These usually include the military, but there may also be economic organizations, bureaucracies, and other groups whose strength the “strong man” needs. He has to make sure that they remain willing.
Any dictator worth his salt tries to minimize the power of these groups and to arrogate as much power as he can to himself and his family. Often, that is not possible, and the dictator must allow these others wealth and power in return for their loyalty. But even when it’s all in the family, he has to keep the family happy. Unhappy families are all alike – they can dissolve into conflict and even treachery.
This is one of the messages of The Dictator’s Handbook by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith.
Now, for those who are preoccupied with Wall Street, with its huge salaries and bonuses despite financial failure, Joshua Tucker at The Monkey Cage , extracts the money quote from The Handbook.
In terms of the political organization of businesses, large publically [sic] traded companies most closely resemble rigged election autocracies. There are typically millions of people – shareholders – with a nominal say in the choice of chief executive. But in reality the decision to retain a leader comes down to the choices of senior executives, board members and possibly a few large institutional investors. No executive lasts long if he does not keep this small group happy, which is why such insiders receive large bonuses and rewards even as the organization fails.--------------
* Most readers will recognize the allusion in the title of this post. For those who don’t follow the GOP all that closely, the reference is here.
Lessons in Journalism
October 21, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Ah, the New York Post. Some years ago, I said here that regardless of the actual content of the front page headline, the subtext is almost always the same.
This morning, the Post was playing off the old journalistic cliche: Go for the local angle. While stuffy papers like the Times and the Wall Street Journal reported the death of Khadafy as an international story, the Post nailed the real import of the event for us New Yorkers.
Posted by Jay Livingston
Ah, the New York Post. Some years ago, I said here that regardless of the actual content of the front page headline, the subtext is almost always the same.
This morning, the Post was playing off the old journalistic cliche: Go for the local angle. While stuffy papers like the Times and the Wall Street Journal reported the death of Khadafy as an international story, the Post nailed the real import of the event for us New Yorkers.
If Your Survey Doesn’t Find What You Want It to Find . . .
October 19, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston(Cross posted at Sociological Images)
. . . say that it did.
Doug Schoen is a pollster who wants the Democrats to distance themselves from the Occupy Wall Street protesters. (Schoen is Mayor Bloomberg’s pollster. He has also worked for Bill Clinton.) In The Wall Street Journal yesterday (here), he reported on a survey done by a researcher at his firm. She interviewed 200 of the protesters in Zucotti Park.
Here is Schoen’s overall take:
More to the point, that “large majority” opposed to free-market capitalism is 4% – eight of the people interviewed. Another eight said they wanted “radical redistribution of wealth.” So at most, 16 people, 8%, mentioned these goals. (The full results of the survey are available here.)
The big poster in the foreground, the one that captures your attention, is radical militance – the waif from the “Les Mis” poster turned revolutionary. But the specific points on the sign at the right are conventional liberal policies – the policies of the current Administration.*
There are other ways to misinterpret survey results. Here is Schoen in the WSJ:
As evidence for the extreme radicalism of the protestors, Schoen says,
Reading Schoen, you get the impression that these are hard-core activists, old hands at political demonstrations, with Phil Ochs on their iPods and a well-thumbed copy of “The Manifesto” in their pockets. In fact, the protesters were mostly young people with not much political experience who wanted to work within the system (i.e., with the Democratic party) to achieve fairly conventional goals, like keeping the financial industry from driving the economy into a ditch again.
And according to a recent Time survey, more than half of America views them favorably.
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* There were other signs with other messages. In fact, sign-making seemed to be one of the major activities in Zucotti Park. Some of them. like these, did not seem designed to get much play in the media.
Posted by Jay Livingston(Cross posted at Sociological Images)
. . . say that it did.
Doug Schoen is a pollster who wants the Democrats to distance themselves from the Occupy Wall Street protesters. (Schoen is Mayor Bloomberg’s pollster. He has also worked for Bill Clinton.) In The Wall Street Journal yesterday (here), he reported on a survey done by a researcher at his firm. She interviewed 200 of the protesters in Zucotti Park.
Here is Schoen’s overall take:
What binds a large majority of the protesters together—regardless of age, socioeconomic status or education—is a deep commitment to left-wing policies: opposition to free-market capitalism and support for radical redistribution of wealth, intense regulation of the private sector, and protectionist policies to keep American jobs from going overseas.I suppose it’s nitpicking to point out that the survey did not ask about SES or education. Even if it had, breaking the 200 respondents down into these categories would give numbers too small for comparison.
More to the point, that “large majority” opposed to free-market capitalism is 4% – eight of the people interviewed. Another eight said they wanted “radical redistribution of wealth.” So at most, 16 people, 8%, mentioned these goals. (The full results of the survey are available here.)
What would you like to see the Occupy Wall Street movement achieve? {Open Ended}Schoen’s distortion reminded me of this photo that I took on Saturday (it was our semi-annual Sociology New York Walk, and Zucotti Park was our first stop).
35% Influence the Democratic Party the way the Tea Party has influenced the GOP
4% Radical redistribution of wealth 5% Overhaul of tax system: replace income tax with flat tax
7% Direct Democracy
9% Engage & mobilize Progressives
9% Promote a national conversation
11% Break the two-party duopoly
4% Dissolution of our representative democracy/capitalist system 4% Single payer health care
4% Pull out of Afghanistan immediately
8% Not sure
The big poster in the foreground, the one that captures your attention, is radical militance – the waif from the “Les Mis” poster turned revolutionary. But the specific points on the sign at the right are conventional liberal policies – the policies of the current Administration.*
There are other ways to misinterpret survey results. Here is Schoen in the WSJ:
Sixty-five percent say that government has a moral responsibility to guarantee all citizens access to affordable health care, a college education, and a secure retirement—no matter the cost.Here is the actual question:
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Government has a moral responsibility to guarantee healthcare, college education, and a secure retirement for all.“No matter the cost” is not in the question. As careful survey researchers know, even slight changes in wording can affect responses. And including or omitting “no matter the cost” is hardly a slight change.
As evidence for the extreme radicalism of the protestors, Schoen says,
By a large margin (77%-22%), they support raising taxes on the wealthiest Americans,Schoen doesn’t bother to mention that this isn’t much different from what you’d find outside Zucotti Park. Recent polls by Pew and Gallup find support for increased taxes on the wealthy ($250,000 or more) at 67%. (Given the small sample size of the Zucotti poll, 67% may be within the margin of error.) Gallup also finds the majorities of two-thirds or more think that banks, large corporations, and lobbyists have too much power.
Thus Occupy Wall Street is a group of engaged progressives who are disillusioned with the capitalist system and have a distinct activist orientation. . . . .Half (52%) have participated in a political movement before.That means that half the protesters were never politically active until Occupy Wall Street inspired them.
Reading Schoen, you get the impression that these are hard-core activists, old hands at political demonstrations, with Phil Ochs on their iPods and a well-thumbed copy of “The Manifesto” in their pockets. In fact, the protesters were mostly young people with not much political experience who wanted to work within the system (i.e., with the Democratic party) to achieve fairly conventional goals, like keeping the financial industry from driving the economy into a ditch again.
And according to a recent Time survey, more than half of America views them favorably.
------------------------------
* There were other signs with other messages. In fact, sign-making seemed to be one of the major activities in Zucotti Park. Some of them. like these, did not seem designed to get much play in the media.
Sex, Society, and Spatial Ability
October 18, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Cross posted at Sociological Images
It’s the kind of finding to warm the hearts of us liberal, Larry-Summers-hating, gender-egalitarians. Summers – you saw him in “The Social Network” as the Harvard president who had no patience for the Winklevoss twins (he didn’t have much patience for Cornell West either and probably many other things) – suggested that the dearth of women in top science and engineering positions was caused not so much by social forces as by innate sex differences in math ability. (More here and many other places.)
As others were quick to point out, those differences are greater in societies with greater gender inequality. That’s why the math gender gap in the US has become much narrower. In societies with greater equality, like Sweden, Norway, and Israeli kibbutzim, the male-female gap in math disappears.* But even in those societies, males still score higher on spatial reasoning.
I’m sure that evol-psych has some explanation for why male brains evolved to be more adept at spatial reasoning. I’m equally sure that those who favor social explanations can find residual sexism even in Sweden to explain spatial differences. That’s why a field experiment reported last summer is so interesting.
The research team (Moshe Hoffman and colleagues, link to pdf here) tested people from two tribes in northern India – the Karbi and the Khasi. These had once been a single tribe but had split recently – a few hundred years ago. (Recent is a relative term, and we’re talking evolution here.) So they were similar economically (subsistence farming of rice) and genetically.
Researchers went to four villages of each tribe, recruited subjects to solve this puzzle
They offered an additional 20 rupees if the subject could solve the puzzle in 30 seconds or less.
In the patrilineal society, women were much slower to solve the puzzle than were men. But among the matrilineal Khasi, the difference was negligible.
The results are encouraging, at least for those who argue for greater gender equality. But I’m not sure how much weight to give this one study, mostly because of sample size. Is the sample the 1300 villagers who worked the puzzle? Or is it 1 – one inter-tribal comparison?
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* Even a small difference in the means will make for a large difference in who is represented in the tail of the distribution. Imagine two groups with average height a half-inch apart – Group Blue 5' 10", Group Red 5' 10 ½".
Summers was arguing not that there was a difference in the means but that the variation was greater among males. That wider distribution as well would make for a preponderance of males in the upper reaches of the scale (and at the lower end).
Posted by Jay Livingston
Cross posted at Sociological Images
It’s the kind of finding to warm the hearts of us liberal, Larry-Summers-hating, gender-egalitarians. Summers – you saw him in “The Social Network” as the Harvard president who had no patience for the Winklevoss twins (he didn’t have much patience for Cornell West either and probably many other things) – suggested that the dearth of women in top science and engineering positions was caused not so much by social forces as by innate sex differences in math ability. (More here and many other places.)
As others were quick to point out, those differences are greater in societies with greater gender inequality. That’s why the math gender gap in the US has become much narrower. In societies with greater equality, like Sweden, Norway, and Israeli kibbutzim, the male-female gap in math disappears.* But even in those societies, males still score higher on spatial reasoning.
The research team (Moshe Hoffman and colleagues, link to pdf here) tested people from two tribes in northern India – the Karbi and the Khasi. These had once been a single tribe but had split recently – a few hundred years ago. (Recent is a relative term, and we’re talking evolution here.) So they were similar economically (subsistence farming of rice) and genetically.
- The Karbi are patrilineal. Only the men own property, and they pass that property to their sons. Males get more education.
- Khasi society is matrilineal. Men turn their earnings over to their wives. Only women own property, which is passed along only to daughters. Males and females have similar levels of education.
Researchers went to four villages of each tribe, recruited subjects to solve this puzzle
They offered an additional 20 rupees if the subject could solve the puzzle in 30 seconds or less.
In the patrilineal society, women were much slower to solve the puzzle than were men. But among the matrilineal Khasi, the difference was negligible.
The results are encouraging, at least for those who argue for greater gender equality. But I’m not sure how much weight to give this one study, mostly because of sample size. Is the sample the 1300 villagers who worked the puzzle? Or is it 1 – one inter-tribal comparison?
-------------------------
* Even a small difference in the means will make for a large difference in who is represented in the tail of the distribution. Imagine two groups with average height a half-inch apart – Group Blue 5' 10", Group Red 5' 10 ½".
Pink shows overlap.
If you’re picking a basketball team randomly (from the pink part of the distribution), you’ll probably wind up with as many Blues as Reds. But if you’re choosing from among those few who are 6' 6" or taller, you’re going to have more Reds.Summers was arguing not that there was a difference in the means but that the variation was greater among males. That wider distribution as well would make for a preponderance of males in the upper reaches of the scale (and at the lower end).
Ground Zero - The Sacred and the Profane
October 14, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
What’s so infuriating about reading David Brooks is that sometimes he gets it right, but then in the next sentence, he’ll veer off in the wrong direction. (Translation: Sometimes I agree with him, sometimes I disagree.)
Today (here) Brooks is writing about the rebuilding at Ground Zero and about Chris Ward, who was brought in to organize the whole project when it had become badly bogged down in conflict.
More important, Brooks closes his copy of Durkheim just when he should be turning to the next page. Brooks ignores the structural problem. The Ground Zero project inevitably comprises two functions – the sacred and the profane.** Like the buildings the terrorists destroyed, the new ones will be places where work, where they carry out the practical business of everyday life – buying and selling, making phone calls, entering and analyzing data. But just because of its location, people will see the new structures as sacred.
Usually, we separate these two realms. We have sacred places and buildings whose only purpose is to enhance some group symbolism. We do not ask our office buildings and schools, stores and shopping malls, streets and parking lots, to express our collective spiritual ideas. Nor do we ask that the Washington Monument and the Statue of Liberty do something useful like house the Department of Transportation or a Wal-Mart.
It’s hard enough to design a purely sacred monument – look at the controversies over memorials for Flight 93 and the Vietnam War dead. Nor is it easy to design a huge complex of offices, parks, subways, etc. that works. But to create something that carries out both functions to everyone’s satisfaction may be impossible.
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*For example, Brooks says that gun policy is “seen as an assault on or defense of the whole rural lifestyle so to compromise on any front is to court dishonor.” Doesn’t he listen to the gunslingers? They’re not talking about lifestyles and dishonor. They’re talking about their individual freedom and safety.
** Profane in the sense of everyday and practical, not sacrilegious.
Posted by Jay Livingston
What’s so infuriating about reading David Brooks is that sometimes he gets it right, but then in the next sentence, he’ll veer off in the wrong direction. (Translation: Sometimes I agree with him, sometimes I disagree.)
Today (here) Brooks is writing about the rebuilding at Ground Zero and about Chris Ward, who was brought in to organize the whole project when it had become badly bogged down in conflict.
Ward quickly understood his mission: to take a sacred cause and turn it into a building project. That is to say, to demystify it, to see it as it really is and not through the gauze of everybody’s emotions surrounding 9/11.Ward’s approach, as Brooks says, was to desacralize the mission, and Brooks picks out the detail that epitomizes this change
He changed the name of Freedom Tower to One World Trade Center.But then Brooks tries to see Ground Zero as just one more example of a more general trend.
Maybe it’s part of living in a postmaterialist economy, but nearly every practical question becomes a values question. . . . Many issues that were once concrete and practical are distorted because they have become symbolic and spiritual.Tax policy, gun control, and Green Tech, says Brooks, all crumple under the weight of this symbolism. Yes, these issues (he could have added health care to the list) can involve status politics, but it’s not at all clear how much the symbolism affects the actual policies. Besides, Brooks gets the symbolism wrong.*
More important, Brooks closes his copy of Durkheim just when he should be turning to the next page. Brooks ignores the structural problem. The Ground Zero project inevitably comprises two functions – the sacred and the profane.** Like the buildings the terrorists destroyed, the new ones will be places where work, where they carry out the practical business of everyday life – buying and selling, making phone calls, entering and analyzing data. But just because of its location, people will see the new structures as sacred.
Usually, we separate these two realms. We have sacred places and buildings whose only purpose is to enhance some group symbolism. We do not ask our office buildings and schools, stores and shopping malls, streets and parking lots, to express our collective spiritual ideas. Nor do we ask that the Washington Monument and the Statue of Liberty do something useful like house the Department of Transportation or a Wal-Mart.
It’s hard enough to design a purely sacred monument – look at the controversies over memorials for Flight 93 and the Vietnam War dead. Nor is it easy to design a huge complex of offices, parks, subways, etc. that works. But to create something that carries out both functions to everyone’s satisfaction may be impossible.
-------------------------------
*For example, Brooks says that gun policy is “seen as an assault on or defense of the whole rural lifestyle so to compromise on any front is to court dishonor.” Doesn’t he listen to the gunslingers? They’re not talking about lifestyles and dishonor. They’re talking about their individual freedom and safety.
** Profane in the sense of everyday and practical, not sacrilegious.
Following Steve Jobs
October 13, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
In the early 1980s, Steve Jobs wanted John Sculley, then head of marketing for Pepsi, to join Apple. The story and its money quote are legendary. Said Jobs to Sculley:
I think I first heard the story told by Sculley himself, probably on “60 Minutes.” It’s a great line, of course, but there was an overtone I couldn’t quite place, something about it that seemed vaguely familiar that I couldn’t quite place.
I had forgotten about it, but now Kieran Healy has posted a long and perceptive essay “A Sociology of Steve Jobs” on Jobs and charismatic authority. You could assign it, you should assign it, to undergraduates to show them the relevance of Weber and how his ideas can be brilliantly applied to their own world.
But for me, the best part was that Kieran knew, as though it were obvious, the echo in the Sculley quote, and shame on me for not seeing it. The giveaway is the “or come with me” part. It’s Jesus gathering his disciples.
Posted by Jay Livingston
In the early 1980s, Steve Jobs wanted John Sculley, then head of marketing for Pepsi, to join Apple. The story and its money quote are legendary. Said Jobs to Sculley:
Do you want to sell sugar water for the rest of your life or come with me and change the world?Sculley went to Apple.
I think I first heard the story told by Sculley himself, probably on “60 Minutes.” It’s a great line, of course, but there was an overtone I couldn’t quite place, something about it that seemed vaguely familiar that I couldn’t quite place.
I had forgotten about it, but now Kieran Healy has posted a long and perceptive essay “A Sociology of Steve Jobs” on Jobs and charismatic authority. You could assign it, you should assign it, to undergraduates to show them the relevance of Weber and how his ideas can be brilliantly applied to their own world.
But for me, the best part was that Kieran knew, as though it were obvious, the echo in the Sculley quote, and shame on me for not seeing it. The giveaway is the “or come with me” part. It’s Jesus gathering his disciples.
And as He walked by the Sea of Galilee, He saw Simon and Andrew his brother casting a net into the sea; for they were fishermen. Then Jesus said to them, “Follow Me, and I will make you become fishers of men.” (Mark 1: 16-17)
637 New Blog Posts for Fall
October 10, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Four years ago, I wondered (here) about all those numbers on the covers of women’s magazines. Since then, I have watched as the numbers wax and wane. They never disappeared completely. But for a while, they seemed to fade into disuse, like unfashionable shoes shunted to the back of the closet. But this fall, numbers returned in strength.
What’s up with all the numbers? Of course, there’s no single answer, but I see them as particularly resonant with some themes of American culture – abundance, freedom, success, and self-improvement.
Some of these numbers just tell you that you’re getting a lot for your money. Lucky promises “8,000 Giveaways,” while Vogue and In Style tell you how many pages you’ll get when you plunk down your $4.99 (Vogue wins, by 120 pages). Maybe the publishers think we have a preference for quantity over quality, like those restaurants that advertise “all you can eat.” More is better.
Still, how many new looks can a woman have for the fall? I don’t know, and I’m not even sure what constitutes a new look. But it must be only a small fraction of the 973 offered by Bazaar. And why not round that number to something that doesn’t look like an area code? The reason, I suspect, is that 973 sounds more precise, not just some number someone made up. They actually counted. The same logic may explain why hers offers 203 fitness tips rather than 200.
The large numbers (485 new styles, 94 bags and boots, 300 beauty tips) also seem to contradict Barry Schwarz’s idea that too much choice is overwhelming and leaves us in choice-paralysis. Maybe the women who dutifully page through Bazaar’s 973 new looks wind up unable to choose one, and they end up plodding through the fall season in their old look. But what is appealing is not the actual choice; it is the idea of choice, the sense of limitless individual freedom to choose among all these looks.
If the big numbers offer the idea of individual self-transformation, the small numbers, like Bazaar’s 10 key pieces, make it seem more possible. You can really do this, they say. Numbers like Oxygen’s 23 days (for sexy abs) and 21 ways (to live longer) give us a program, a schedule. Their message is one of success through self-help and self-improvement, like Gatsby’s schedule and “general resolves.”
Gatsby’s list included “Read one improving book or magazine per week.” I doubt that Gatsby had Allure in mind, but they both did think big.
Posted by Jay Livingston
Four years ago, I wondered (here) about all those numbers on the covers of women’s magazines. Since then, I have watched as the numbers wax and wane. They never disappeared completely. But for a while, they seemed to fade into disuse, like unfashionable shoes shunted to the back of the closet. But this fall, numbers returned in strength.
Still, how many new looks can a woman have for the fall? I don’t know, and I’m not even sure what constitutes a new look. But it must be only a small fraction of the 973 offered by Bazaar. And why not round that number to something that doesn’t look like an area code? The reason, I suspect, is that 973 sounds more precise, not just some number someone made up. They actually counted. The same logic may explain why hers offers 203 fitness tips rather than 200.
The large numbers (485 new styles, 94 bags and boots, 300 beauty tips) also seem to contradict Barry Schwarz’s idea that too much choice is overwhelming and leaves us in choice-paralysis. Maybe the women who dutifully page through Bazaar’s 973 new looks wind up unable to choose one, and they end up plodding through the fall season in their old look. But what is appealing is not the actual choice; it is the idea of choice, the sense of limitless individual freedom to choose among all these looks.
If the big numbers offer the idea of individual self-transformation, the small numbers, like Bazaar’s 10 key pieces, make it seem more possible. You can really do this, they say. Numbers like Oxygen’s 23 days (for sexy abs) and 21 ways (to live longer) give us a program, a schedule. Their message is one of success through self-help and self-improvement, like Gatsby’s schedule and “general resolves.”
Gatsby’s list included “Read one improving book or magazine per week.” I doubt that Gatsby had Allure in mind, but they both did think big.
Good Neighbor Policy
October 5, 2011Posted by Jay Livingston
From Keith Humphreys, in the style of Harper’s Index:
From Keith Humphreys, in the style of Harper’s Index:
- Number of gun shops at or near the 1,970 mile U.S.-Mexico Border: 7,600
- Proportion of those gun shops that are on the U.S. side: 100%
And Get Me Rewrite
October 4, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
The blog Aluation has this fascinating post.
That’s the whole thing – two sentences from two versions of the same news story. And two different by-lines. I don’t know what Colin Moynihan’s official position at the Times is, but Al Baker is the chief of the Times police bureau. Write your own story as to how this change happened.
Aluation’s post just prior to this is a long and informative analysis of the same topic – press coverage of Occupy Wall Street and protests in other countries: “bold political protesters abroad, stupid criminal hippies at home.”
Posted by Jay Livingston
The blog Aluation has this fascinating post.
That’s the whole thing – two sentences from two versions of the same news story. And two different by-lines. I don’t know what Colin Moynihan’s official position at the Times is, but Al Baker is the chief of the Times police bureau. Write your own story as to how this change happened.
Aluation’s post just prior to this is a long and informative analysis of the same topic – press coverage of Occupy Wall Street and protests in other countries: “bold political protesters abroad, stupid criminal hippies at home.”
Taxes and Freedom
October 3, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Denmark is adding a tax on fatty foods to the already hefty tax burden on their citizens.
In the US, nobody in public life can get away with saying a good word about taxes. Maybe Warren Buffet, but he’s not running for office. The Republican mantra “It’s your money, it’s not the government’s money” has great appeal, and the Republicans and Tea Partistas have clearly stated their preference that government shut down rather than raise taxes to pay for what the government does.
After all, less government equals more freedom. Or does it?
Bruce Bartlett at the Times Economix blog,checked out some of those low-tax countries, nations that are well below the 27% tax-to-GDP ratio of the US. Then he went to the Heritage Foundation site to see how these nations ranked on the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom. Here are the results. (On the Freedom Index, a high score is good. A score above 80 (only six countries) is “free”; a score below 50 is “repressed.”)
(The tax-to-GDP ratio is very slightly different from what you find here, and obviously the score on Libya is from before the fall of Gaddafi.)
Where to go if I couldn’t stay in the US – Chad or Denmark? The freedom of low taxes or the high-tax nanny state? It’s a tough choice, but I think I’d go with Denmark even though language might be a problem. The only Danish I know is prune.
Posted by Jay Livingston
Denmark is adding a tax on fatty foods to the already hefty tax burden on their citizens.
In the US, nobody in public life can get away with saying a good word about taxes. Maybe Warren Buffet, but he’s not running for office. The Republican mantra “It’s your money, it’s not the government’s money” has great appeal, and the Republicans and Tea Partistas have clearly stated their preference that government shut down rather than raise taxes to pay for what the government does.
After all, less government equals more freedom. Or does it?
Bruce Bartlett at the Times Economix blog,checked out some of those low-tax countries, nations that are well below the 27% tax-to-GDP ratio of the US. Then he went to the Heritage Foundation site to see how these nations ranked on the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom. Here are the results. (On the Freedom Index, a high score is good. A score above 80 (only six countries) is “free”; a score below 50 is “repressed.”)
(The tax-to-GDP ratio is very slightly different from what you find here, and obviously the score on Libya is from before the fall of Gaddafi.)
Where to go if I couldn’t stay in the US – Chad or Denmark? The freedom of low taxes or the high-tax nanny state? It’s a tough choice, but I think I’d go with Denmark even though language might be a problem. The only Danish I know is prune.
Moneyball
September 30, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Stanford is a three-touchdown favorite over UCLA tomorrow night. Which is the more desirable team?
If you said Stanford, you’re probably one of those people who thinks that the Big Ten consists of ten schools. You probably also thought that football was all about points on the board – six for a touchdown, three for a field goal, and so on. Silly you.
As the recent (and perhaps continuing) realignment of conferences makes clear, college football is about points, but they are Nielsen points. And on the Nielsen scoreboard, UCLA crushes Stanford.
HT: My colleague George Martin for calling Silver's article to my attention.
UPDATE, Oct. 2: By game time, UCLA was a 23-point underdogs. Stanford won 45 - 19. No information yet on how many viewers watched the game on TV.
Posted by Jay Livingston
Stanford is a three-touchdown favorite over UCLA tomorrow night. Which is the more desirable team?
If you said Stanford, you’re probably one of those people who thinks that the Big Ten consists of ten schools. You probably also thought that football was all about points on the board – six for a touchdown, three for a field goal, and so on. Silly you.
As the recent (and perhaps continuing) realignment of conferences makes clear, college football is about points, but they are Nielsen points. And on the Nielsen scoreboard, UCLA crushes Stanford.
The graphic is from a Nate Silver article at The New York Times (here). It’s the companion piece to Taylor Branch’s recent article in the Atlantic. Branch gives the sordid details. Nate Silver provides the systematic numbers – fan base and TV market share. What both make clear is that college football is not about good match-ups. It’s about good profits.
The S.E.C.’s interest in Texas A&M becomes easier to understand once you recognize that the Aggies have among the largest fan bases in the country. The fact that Notre Dame’s fans are dispersed throughout the country explains why they’ve been loathe to join a conference. And that the West Coast is less enthusiastic about football than other parts of the country, making the Pacific-12 a harder sale to the television networks, explains why the conference is going to great lengths to expand into football-crazy states like Texas.Not to go all Marxist here, but by design, the money flows entirely to the networks, to the universities, and to the coaches. The workers who put their bodies on the line get nothing. Actually some of them do get some trinkets and favors, but in the ideal world of the NCAA, they are supposed to get zero dollars. After all, they are not workers. They are scholar-athletes, and they do get scholarships, which are worth something, though it’s questionable whether they get much of an education. But even though they produce substantial amounts of revenue for other people, they are not workers. Running back Kent Waldrep was paralyzed during a game in 1974. When his university stopped paying for his medical bills, he sued for workers’ compensation.
The appeals court finally rejected Waldrep’s claim in June of 2000, ruling that he was not an employee because he had not paid taxes on financial aid that he could have kept even if he quit football.The university – ironists take note – was Texas Christian.
HT: My colleague George Martin for calling Silver's article to my attention.
UPDATE, Oct. 2: By game time, UCLA was a 23-point underdogs. Stanford won 45 - 19. No information yet on how many viewers watched the game on TV.
Education Divested
September 28, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Here in New Jersey, as in Wisconsin and elsewhere, the governor has been attacking educators and cutting education budgets, and educators have been doing their best to fight back.
In France too, professors are trying to win public support against the “depouillement” of education. The word literally means stripping or skinning, leaving something bare, and it carries the same connotations as the English “fleecing.” So the profs have posed, depouillé, for a calendar.
The writing on the blackboard carries a message appropriate both to the academic area and to the protest. The double meaning gets lost in a literal translation. “Let’s do economics, not budget-cutting.”
The decreasing function in math is more obvious.
As you might expect, the conservative reaction laments that by doing something that might win public opinion to their side, the profs “dévalorisaient la profession.” Of course, if you really want to “devalue” something, you reduce the money you allocate to it, which is what the government is doing.
View and download all twelve months here, all safe for work. The calendar begins with Septembre 2011, so you’d better hurry.
HT: Maîtresse
Posted by Jay Livingston
Here in New Jersey, as in Wisconsin and elsewhere, the governor has been attacking educators and cutting education budgets, and educators have been doing their best to fight back.
In France too, professors are trying to win public support against the “depouillement” of education. The word literally means stripping or skinning, leaving something bare, and it carries the same connotations as the English “fleecing.” So the profs have posed, depouillé, for a calendar.
The writing on the blackboard carries a message appropriate both to the academic area and to the protest. The double meaning gets lost in a literal translation. “Let’s do economics, not budget-cutting.”
The decreasing function in math is more obvious.
As you might expect, the conservative reaction laments that by doing something that might win public opinion to their side, the profs “dévalorisaient la profession.” Of course, if you really want to “devalue” something, you reduce the money you allocate to it, which is what the government is doing.
View and download all twelve months here, all safe for work. The calendar begins with Septembre 2011, so you’d better hurry.
HT: Maîtresse
Chic Cliques (or is it Chick Clicks?)
September 27, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Sara Wakefield mentioned on Facebook that Kindergarten Moms’ night was “remarkably like high school where I did okay with all groups but fit in with none.” (I took note because at the time, I was just about to leave for my own high school reunion.)
The social structure of high school, it seems, is all about cliques – freaks and geeks,* jocks and emos, preps, goths, cool kids, et. al. But there’s a paradox here. Whenever I ask students about cliques in high school, they all say pretty much what Sara said. (I mean, that's what they say once they figure out that when I say “clique” – rhymes with “antique” or “unique” – I really mean “click.”) I ask them to jot down a list of the cliques at their school. Some make longer lists, some shorter, but nobody sits there with a blank sheet of paper. Then, when I ask them which they were in, it turns out that nobody was a member of any clique. Instead, like Sara, they affiliated loosely with many of the groups, or they had friends in several different cliques.
But wait a minute. You can’t have a group without members. So if nobody is a member of any clique, then cliques don’t exist. How can everyone see all these cliques when nobody in the school belongs to a clique?
The paradox stems from two different definitions or ways of thinking about cliques – as an actual group, and as a label. When we think about other people, we think of the clique as both – group and label. But when we think about ourselves, we think of the clique primarily as a label. And while we are very willing to apply a label to other people, we resist labeling ourselves.
Attribution theory has a similar take on “personality.” If we are given a list of personality traits – from Affable to Zany – and asked to say whether they apply to some person we know, we have no trouble going through the list and checking Yes or No for each trait. But when asked if those traits apply to us, we balk and go for the column marked “depends on the situation.” As one of the attribution pioneers (Walter Mischel?) put it, apparently a personality is something that other people have.
The same self/other difference shapes our ideas about cliques – that they are something that other people belong to – and for the same reason: the clique label, like the personality trait, is too limiting. To say that I am “introverted” implies that this is how I am. Always. But “always” doesn’t feel right. For one thing, I know that sometimes I can act in a very outgoing way. And for another, if I assign myself that label, then I can never act effusively and still be true to who I “really” am.
Similarly, to label myself as “one of the cool kids,” flattering though that may seem, limits me to that characteristic – coolness – when in fact I know there are times when I feel very uncool. And besides, I sometimes hang around with kids who are not in the cool group. (I’m using “I” in the hypothetical, generic sense. In reality, I am not now, nor have I ever been, a member of the cool kids.)
The distinction probably even applies to official groups like the football team. If you’re not a member, you might think of them as “the jocks” with all the connotations that the word carries. But I suspect that your local linebacker is more reluctant to apply that label to himself. There’s no doubt that he’s on the team. But he probably doesn’t think of himself as a jock.
So while cliques have a certain reality embodied in real people, they are also cognitive categories that we construct and use to simplify and make sense of the social life of school. Perhaps it’s equally useful to think of cliques not so much as actual groups of people but as ways of being that real people slide into and out of. And if any of what I’m saying here is accurate, how might it apply outside the high school microcosm – for example, to the concept of social class?
---------------------
* At about this same time when Sara and I were thinking about high school, Mrs. Castelli’s students – actual high school students – were thinking and blogging about “Freaks and Geeks.”
Posted by Jay Livingston
Sara Wakefield mentioned on Facebook that Kindergarten Moms’ night was “remarkably like high school where I did okay with all groups but fit in with none.” (I took note because at the time, I was just about to leave for my own high school reunion.)
The social structure of high school, it seems, is all about cliques – freaks and geeks,* jocks and emos, preps, goths, cool kids, et. al. But there’s a paradox here. Whenever I ask students about cliques in high school, they all say pretty much what Sara said. (I mean, that's what they say once they figure out that when I say “clique” – rhymes with “antique” or “unique” – I really mean “click.”) I ask them to jot down a list of the cliques at their school. Some make longer lists, some shorter, but nobody sits there with a blank sheet of paper. Then, when I ask them which they were in, it turns out that nobody was a member of any clique. Instead, like Sara, they affiliated loosely with many of the groups, or they had friends in several different cliques.
But wait a minute. You can’t have a group without members. So if nobody is a member of any clique, then cliques don’t exist. How can everyone see all these cliques when nobody in the school belongs to a clique?
The paradox stems from two different definitions or ways of thinking about cliques – as an actual group, and as a label. When we think about other people, we think of the clique as both – group and label. But when we think about ourselves, we think of the clique primarily as a label. And while we are very willing to apply a label to other people, we resist labeling ourselves.
Attribution theory has a similar take on “personality.” If we are given a list of personality traits – from Affable to Zany – and asked to say whether they apply to some person we know, we have no trouble going through the list and checking Yes or No for each trait. But when asked if those traits apply to us, we balk and go for the column marked “depends on the situation.” As one of the attribution pioneers (Walter Mischel?) put it, apparently a personality is something that other people have.
The same self/other difference shapes our ideas about cliques – that they are something that other people belong to – and for the same reason: the clique label, like the personality trait, is too limiting. To say that I am “introverted” implies that this is how I am. Always. But “always” doesn’t feel right. For one thing, I know that sometimes I can act in a very outgoing way. And for another, if I assign myself that label, then I can never act effusively and still be true to who I “really” am.
Similarly, to label myself as “one of the cool kids,” flattering though that may seem, limits me to that characteristic – coolness – when in fact I know there are times when I feel very uncool. And besides, I sometimes hang around with kids who are not in the cool group. (I’m using “I” in the hypothetical, generic sense. In reality, I am not now, nor have I ever been, a member of the cool kids.)
The distinction probably even applies to official groups like the football team. If you’re not a member, you might think of them as “the jocks” with all the connotations that the word carries. But I suspect that your local linebacker is more reluctant to apply that label to himself. There’s no doubt that he’s on the team. But he probably doesn’t think of himself as a jock.
So while cliques have a certain reality embodied in real people, they are also cognitive categories that we construct and use to simplify and make sense of the social life of school. Perhaps it’s equally useful to think of cliques not so much as actual groups of people but as ways of being that real people slide into and out of. And if any of what I’m saying here is accurate, how might it apply outside the high school microcosm – for example, to the concept of social class?
---------------------
* At about this same time when Sara and I were thinking about high school, Mrs. Castelli’s students – actual high school students – were thinking and blogging about “Freaks and Geeks.”
danah boyd on Bullying asTrue Drama
September 23, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
Long ago, David Matza contrasted two styles of studying deviance – “corrective” and “appreciative.” The corrective approach is moralistic. It applies a prior set of values and shows how the subject under review fails to measure up. It asks, “Why do these people do these bad things, and how can we get them to stop?” The appreciative approach asks, “How does the world look from the subject’s point of view?”
That was the point of my post about sociologists in Las Vegas. But if you want a better example, read the op-ed (here) on bullying in today’s Times by danah boyd* and Alice Marwick. While most writing and research on bullying falls squarely in the corrective camp, boyd and Marwick actually talk with teenagers and listen to them. A lot. Mostly online.
boyd has been writing about social media and “drama” for at least five years. Now that she’s in the newspaper of record, maybe her ideas and observations will get the attention they deserve.
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*The Times insists on initial caps, the first time I’ve ever seen her name printed that way.
Posted by Jay Livingston
Long ago, David Matza contrasted two styles of studying deviance – “corrective” and “appreciative.” The corrective approach is moralistic. It applies a prior set of values and shows how the subject under review fails to measure up. It asks, “Why do these people do these bad things, and how can we get them to stop?” The appreciative approach asks, “How does the world look from the subject’s point of view?”
That was the point of my post about sociologists in Las Vegas. But if you want a better example, read the op-ed (here) on bullying in today’s Times by danah boyd* and Alice Marwick. While most writing and research on bullying falls squarely in the corrective camp, boyd and Marwick actually talk with teenagers and listen to them. A lot. Mostly online.
Given the public interest in cyberbullying, we asked young people about it, only to be continually rebuffed. Teenagers repeatedly told us that bullying was something that happened only in elementary or middle school. “There’s no bullying at this school” was a regular refrain. . . .You should really read the whole article.
While teenagers denounced bullying, they — especially girls — would describe a host of interpersonal conflicts playing out in their lives as “drama.” . . . .
At first, we thought drama was simply an umbrella term, referring to varying forms of bullying, joking around, minor skirmishes between friends, breakups and makeups, and gossip. We thought teenagers viewed bullying as a form of drama. But we realized the two are quite distinct. Drama was not a show for us, but rather a protective mechanism for them.
boyd has been writing about social media and “drama” for at least five years. Now that she’s in the newspaper of record, maybe her ideas and observations will get the attention they deserve.
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*The Times insists on initial caps, the first time I’ve ever seen her name printed that way.
False Equivalence
September 22, 2011
Posted by Jay Livingston
(Cross posted at Sociological Images)
Do Democrats and Republicans have a similar lack of respect for science? Alex Berezow seems to think so. The title of his op-ed in USA Today is “GOP might be anti-science, but so are Democrats.”
I hope that others will point out the false equivalence. For evidence of Democrats’ anti-science, Berezow cites mostly fringe groups like PETA, which objects to scientific research on animals, and fringe issues like vaccination. According to Berezow, many people who oppose vaccination are Democrats. True perhaps, but these positions are held by only a small minority of Democratic voters. And neither of these positions has been espoused by any of the party leaders.*
Compare that to Republican anti-science. Most of the leading GOP presidential hopefuls, now and in the previous election, have voiced their skepticism on evolution and global warming. Only Huntsman and Romney have hinted that they agree with the near–unanimous opinions of scientists in these fields.
Maybe the candidates take these anti-science positions because the people whose votes they want – the GOP faithful – also reject the scientific consensus.
Here are the results of a recent Gallup poll that asked which position “Comes closest to your views.”
Half of all Republicans think that humans have been around for only 10,000 years.
The Republican base is also much more dubious about global warming than are Democrats.
The graph goes only to 2008, and beliefs about global warming since then Americans’ have become somewhat more skeptical about the issue, but I am certain that Republicans are still well above Democrats on the chart.
As for the anti-vaccine crowd, Berezow sees them as mostly Prius-driving, organic-vegan liberals. Maybe so. I have a scientist friend whose son runs an organic food co-op, and she is furious at his decision not to have his kids (her grandchildren) vaccinated. (FWIW, she drives a Prius.) But is there more systematic evidence of this liberal/anti-vaccine connection? Here’s Berezow’s proof.
But there are 46 other states plus DC, and I wondered if they too followed the pattern. So I looked up the CDC data on the percentages of vaccination refusal for non-medical reasons in each state (here). I also got data on how Democratic the state was – the margin of victory or loss for Obama in 2008.**
Sure enough, the top three – Washington, Vermont, and Oregon – are all on the Obama side of the line, though it’s worth noting that in Washington, vaccine exemption was as common in the conservative eastern part of the state (near Idaho, which also has a high exemption rate and was strongly for McCain) as it was in the more liberal western counties. And of the states with 3% or more taking non-medical exemptions from vaccination, eight were for Obama, four for McCain. But overall, the correlation (r = 0.12) is not overwhelming. And even in the most anti-vaccine, pro-Whole Foods states like Washington and Vermont, nearly 95% of parent s had their kindergartners vaccinated. That’s hardly convincing evidence that Democrats are anti-science. Compare that with the 50% of Republicans (and 75% of their presidential hopefuls) who think evolution is a hoax or at best “just a theory.”
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*Berezow notes that seven Democratic senators (and one Republican) wrote a letter to the FDA “threatening to halt approval of a genetically modified salmon.” But he implies that their position had more to do with money than anti-science. They were from the salmony Northwest, while the company seeking approval is in Massachusetts.
** The CDC had no data for Arizona, Colorado, New Hampshire, Minnesota, and Wyoming.
Posted by Jay Livingston
(Cross posted at Sociological Images)
Do Democrats and Republicans have a similar lack of respect for science? Alex Berezow seems to think so. The title of his op-ed in USA Today is “GOP might be anti-science, but so are Democrats.”
I hope that others will point out the false equivalence. For evidence of Democrats’ anti-science, Berezow cites mostly fringe groups like PETA, which objects to scientific research on animals, and fringe issues like vaccination. According to Berezow, many people who oppose vaccination are Democrats. True perhaps, but these positions are held by only a small minority of Democratic voters. And neither of these positions has been espoused by any of the party leaders.*
Compare that to Republican anti-science. Most of the leading GOP presidential hopefuls, now and in the previous election, have voiced their skepticism on evolution and global warming. Only Huntsman and Romney have hinted that they agree with the near–unanimous opinions of scientists in these fields.
Maybe the candidates take these anti-science positions because the people whose votes they want – the GOP faithful – also reject the scientific consensus.
Here are the results of a recent Gallup poll that asked which position “Comes closest to your views.”
- God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last 10 000 years or so
- Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, but God had no part in this process
- Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, but God guided this process
Half of all Republicans think that humans have been around for only 10,000 years.
The Republican base is also much more dubious about global warming than are Democrats.
As for the anti-vaccine crowd, Berezow sees them as mostly Prius-driving, organic-vegan liberals. Maybe so. I have a scientist friend whose son runs an organic food co-op, and she is furious at his decision not to have his kids (her grandchildren) vaccinated. (FWIW, she drives a Prius.) But is there more systematic evidence of this liberal/anti-vaccine connection? Here’s Berezow’s proof.
a public health official once noted that rates of vaccine non-compliance tend to be higher in places where Whole Foods is popular — and 89% of Whole Foods stores are located in counties that favored Barack Obama in 2008. . . . . With the exception of Alaska, the states with the highest rates of vaccine refusal for kindergarteners are Washington, Vermont and Oregon — three of the most progressive states in the country.Areas with Whole Foods have both more vaccine skeptics and more Obama voters. The thread of the logic is a bit thin (how big a difference is “tends to be higher”?), and it runs the risk of the ecological fallacy. But it sounded right to me – my friend’s son lives in Vermont – and 75% (three states out of four) is pretty impressive evidence.
But there are 46 other states plus DC, and I wondered if they too followed the pattern. So I looked up the CDC data on the percentages of vaccination refusal for non-medical reasons in each state (here). I also got data on how Democratic the state was – the margin of victory or loss for Obama in 2008.**
Sure enough, the top three – Washington, Vermont, and Oregon – are all on the Obama side of the line, though it’s worth noting that in Washington, vaccine exemption was as common in the conservative eastern part of the state (near Idaho, which also has a high exemption rate and was strongly for McCain) as it was in the more liberal western counties. And of the states with 3% or more taking non-medical exemptions from vaccination, eight were for Obama, four for McCain. But overall, the correlation (r = 0.12) is not overwhelming. And even in the most anti-vaccine, pro-Whole Foods states like Washington and Vermont, nearly 95% of parent s had their kindergartners vaccinated. That’s hardly convincing evidence that Democrats are anti-science. Compare that with the 50% of Republicans (and 75% of their presidential hopefuls) who think evolution is a hoax or at best “just a theory.”
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*Berezow notes that seven Democratic senators (and one Republican) wrote a letter to the FDA “threatening to halt approval of a genetically modified salmon.” But he implies that their position had more to do with money than anti-science. They were from the salmony Northwest, while the company seeking approval is in Massachusetts.
** The CDC had no data for Arizona, Colorado, New Hampshire, Minnesota, and Wyoming.
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